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August 1980 that the time was not yet ripe to provide divisions in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian
military assistance to Poland, these initial four divisions Military Districts were maintained at 50-75 percent of full
were brought back to a lower state of readiness and the strength (Category 2 readiness), and the other three-
mobilized reservists were released. quarters were kept at only around 20 percent of full
Even so, this did not mean that the first part of the strength (Category 3).20 The allocation of these units is
August 28 directive ceased to be relevant. The scenario shown in Table 1. (Other Category 2 divisions, it is worth
envisaged in the directive was largely preserved in the noting, could have been brought in from elsewhere in the
subsequent mobilization of Soviet troops in late 1980 and western USSR.) Curiously, even though both types of line
1981. In the fall of 1980, after the initial four Soviet divisions were not combat-ready, they were described in
divisions had been demobilized, the Soviet Union Soviet parlance as constantly ready divisions (divizii
gradually brought three motorized rifle divisions up to full postoyannoi gotovnosti).21
troop strength and put them on high alert. In mid- to late The initial mobilization covered by the Suslov
December 1980, U.S. electronic intercepts and satellite Commission s directive, encompassing three tank
reconnaissance were able to confirm that these three divisions and one motorized rifle division, seems just
divisions could have joined an airborne division and the about right in size. This mobilization would have had to
two divisions of the Soviet Union s Northern Group of involve four Category 2 divisions, which could be
NEW EVIDENCE ON THE POLISH CRISIS 1980-1982 105
mobilized very rapidly when necessary. Because Category This explanation may seem plausible at first glance, but it
3 forces would have taken at least one to three months to actually is problematic. It is true that all three of the
bring up to full readiness, they obviously could not have Soviet motorized rifle divisions that were brought up to
been part of the initial mobilization on 28-29 August. Only full strength as of December 1980 were originally
Category 2 forces would have been mobilized at this stage. Category 3 divisions. The weeks that passed in the
Using the lower figure of 50 percent as the manpower autumn of 1980 had permitted enough time for all the pre-
strength of the four Category 2 divisions, one can see that mobilization training and preparations of those units to be
some 22,000 reservists would have been needed to bring completed. But there is no evidence that Category 3
the four up to full strength. The other 3,000 reservists forces were slated for a potential second stage of
presumably would have been allocated to various support mobilization (whose planning was authorized by the 28
and logistical roles. Hence, the total number of mobilized August directive). On the contrary, there is strong reason
reservists in this initial phase on 28-29 August 1980 that to believe that the constantly ready divisions designated
is, 25,000 seems perfectly plausible. for a hypothetical second stage were Category 2 forces (of
which at least eight were available, as shown in Table 1)
Table 1. rather than Category 3. Soviet military commanders were
willing to draw on Category 3 forces when they had ample
Soviet Line Divisions in the Western USSR, Late 1980 time in the fall of 1980 to carry out pre-mobilization
training and preparations for the projected Soyuz-80
Readiness Category Tank Divisions Motorized Rifle exercises (scheduled for early December); but because
Divisions they were not actually mobilizing any of the additional
five to seven Soviet divisions needed for a possible second
Category 2 4 4 stage, they would have wanted to be able to mobilize the
Category 3 10 15 extra divisions very rapidly if circumstances so warranted.
Totals 14 19 Hence, it is highly unlikely that they would have relied on
________________________________________________________________________________ anything other than Category 2 forces for a second-stage
mobilization if such a mobilization had been deemed
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
necessary. The much more numerous Category 3 forces
were useful when sufficient lead-time was available to
Note: These forces potentially could have been supplemented by
mobilize for the first stage of Soyuz-80, but if a second
other forces in the western USSR outside the Baltic, Belorussian,
stage had been necessary at short notice, the Soviet Army
and Transcarpathian Military Districts.
would have wanted to rely on the eight Category 2 forces
________________________________________________________________________________
in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Transcarpathian Military
Districts, supplemented perhaps by Category 2 forces in
The authorized numbers for the hypothetical second
other parts of the western USSR and by combat-ready
phase, however, are somewhat less easy to reconcile. If
units from the Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe.
the additional 75,000 reservists were designated to flesh
A more plausible explanation for the high number of
out five to seven more Category 2 divisions, the number of
reserves in the projected second phase is that Soviet
reservists was considerably higher than it should have
military planners wanted a margin of safety in case they
been. Even if one assumes that seven (rather than five)
needed to mobilize more than seven extra divisions.
additional Category 2 divisions would have been
Authorization to plan for the mobilization of just five to
mobilized and that all seven were motorized divisions
seven extra divisions, as stipulated in the directive, may
(with higher troop strength), only 43,750 reservists would
have seemed enough for an initial request. But Soviet
have been needed to bring the seven divisions up to full
planners undoubtedly wanted leeway to proceed with a
strength. Some of the remaining 31,250 reservists might
larger mobilization if circumstances so warranted. They
have been assigned to support and logistical roles, but it is
could have mobilized at least eight Category 2 divisions in
unlikely that this would have accounted for more than
the western USSR (as shown in Table 1), and they might
about 8,000 to 10,000. Hence, a gap of well over 20,000
have wanted additional reservists to fill out Category 2
remains.
divisions that could have been brought in from elsewhere.
Two possible factors may account for this gap.
Indeed, it seems likely that by December 1980 the Soviet
First, it might be argued that some or all of the five to
Army was planning for the possible mobilization of
seven extra divisions would have been Category 3 forces
another eleven divisions rather than just five to seven.
(so-called cadre divisions or inactive divisions ) rather
East German military documents and the testimony of a
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